TRANSFOMING THE CZECH ARMED FORCES TO INFORMATION AGE WARFARE
… we consider Networked Enabled Capability as a fundamental prerequisite to achieve final goals of the transformation of the professional Czech armed forces and achieving final operational capabilities of the Czech armed forces for participating in a full spectrum of allied and coalition operations within the range of approved national political-military ambitions of the Czech Republic. Beyond inadequate financing, the strategy also suffered from a shortage of experience and understanding of its implementers in allocating force structure to a networked warfare environment. Inconsistent implementation of the national NEC strategy, poorly defined Mission Capability Packages (MCPs), an Industrial Age doctrinal interpretation of command and control (C2) concepts, and predominantly technically oriented development priorities toward aligning the ACR with an emerging network enabled environment in the 21 st century constitute the major weaknesses in transforming ACR to an information age networked enabled force. Additionally, these deficiencies have frustrated the ACR's ability to meet national force requirements and commitments towards the development of the future NATO force.
Transforming the ACR into a 21 st century information age networked enabled force will face many challenges. It is beyond the scope of this paper to identify and address all of them. This paper will examine the viability of current C2 concepts and organizational structure in the ACR for the 21 st century network enabled warfare. It will address weaknesses in key doctrinal documents related to C2 concepts, as well as gaps in the SFNEC for transforming the force to the Information Age. This paper will also recommend important doctrinal changes in C2 concepts; organizational adjustments in the ACR and alternative strategies for implementing the NEC. These changes will enhance the combat power and effectiveness of the ACR.
Recent research in C2 concepts and approaches to networked warfare invite a 7 It concluded by observing that the creation of a NEC in the ACR "is a key prerequisite for increasing the overall operational capabilities of the forces and is one of principal pillars of the transformation of ACR to a professional force." 8 The Czech National Security Strategy (NSS) considers "developing technical and technological capabilities for processing and transmission of information, with an emphasis on information protection and accessibility" as an interest of national importance. 9 The NSS identified importance of achieving compatibility between the ACR and its partners by stating, "The basic principle for safeguarding the defense and security of the CR is active involvement in the NATO system of collective defense." 10 The Military Strategy of the Czech Republic (NMS) similarly recognizes the strategic importance of and the dependency of the CR on the Alliance. It provides that "collective defense within NATO is the only effective, efficient and credible means of defense of the CR." 11 This strategic guidance specifies the requirements for implementing technical and technological developmental programs, including a national-level NEC, in harmony with the CR's allies to achieve coherent effects in NATO operations. 12 By defining the political-military ambitions of the CR, the NMS helps determine priorities with respect to the specific units of the ACR. 13 The recently released national strategic defense vision paper The White Book of Defense of the Czech Republic (WBD) elaborates these priorities in more detail. It states "cyber-defense and the ability to operate in an integrated information environment within the framework of NATO operations are key developmental priorities" irrespective of envisioned future fiscal constraints. 14 The WBD also provides that the main concern is the units, which fall within provisions of political-military ambitions of the CR. Such strict guidance does not merely respect fiscal constraints; it signifies more importantly that primarily those units represent national commitments of the CR toward the NATO system of collective defense. 
Examination of Command and Control Arrangements Weaknesses
Misinterpretation of C2 Functions. The central issue to the successful implementation of the SFNEC is "the need to understand C2 thoroughly." 20 Since the dissolution of Warsaw pact, the ACR has striven to break away from the Soviet  faster, more inclusive and comprehensive bi-directional information flows among unit, particularly laterally, to enable effective operational selfsynchronization at the tactical level;
 faster corporate learning;
 an ability to develop more viable options for effective action faster than an opponent; and implement viable options faster than an opponent could counter them;
 confronting an opponent with overwhelming complexity. 26 Simply put, if there is a case for decision, it does not necessarily mean that it requires a commander to function. "When it is recognized that some adjustments are required, the function of control is to, within the limits established by command, make changes to the established roles, responsibilities, and relationships, and the rules and constraints that are in effect." 27 Unintended consequences of this way of thinking are that it prevents subordinates from developing new core competencies needed for Information Age organization like "self-synchronization and collaboration". 28 Industrial
Age thinking decreases C2 quality. It results in the lack of empowerment of subordinates. Empowered subordinates can use robustly shared information for better interaction, which enhances effectiveness and agility.
Lack of Empowerment. ACR Pub-53-01-1 Command and Control in Operations
provides that "command rests exclusively in the hands of the commander. It includes authority, decision-making, leadership and control." 29 The document further provides that a commander is a center element of command. The commander is the "key person in the process of C2." 30 The role of a commander is "decisive for successful command and control." 31 is the empowerment of individuals and organizational entities for unlimited interaction, robust information sharing, and elimination of unnecessary C2 constraints. 35 With application of power to the edge C2 concepts, "military organizations will be able to overcome the shortcomings of their Industrial Age predecessors and develop the interoperability and agility necessary for success." 36 The changes need to include the way militaries think about the use of information and the power it bears in a robust network. Militaries must change the way they understand the essence of command and how they exercise control in networked warfare.
Military operations are "enormously complex, and complexity theory tells us that enterprises organize best from the bottom-up." 37 Arthur Cebrowski contended "… the new technology enables much greater military effectiveness from self-synchronization by tactical units rather than from traditional hierarchical command structures." 38 Traditionally, however, a military commander works to obtain top-down command directed synchronization to properly mass fires at the point of contact with the enemy.
The unconstrained interaction will intensify the use of information. This will result in increased speed of command, bottom-up self-synchronization, and higher situational awareness. The theorist Jeff Cares in his book Distributed Networked Operations refines the essence of networked centric operations. He suggests that with new C2
concepts "where power generates from robust networked enabled interaction, the fluid, self-synchronizing military force will be the norm, at least at tactical level." 39 The primary advantage in these self-synchronizing forces "arises from networked affects." 40 He discusses distributed networked operations within the concepts of adaptive control theory in an emerging complex and non-linear operational environment, and envisions combat by a large number of diverse, small units rather than by a small number of generally homogenous, large units. 41 It is important for all militaries aspiring to transform to Information Age to study this new theory for future operations and embed the gained knowledge into doctrinal documents.
Networked warfare, where decision-making information goes out to the edges, involves changes in collective behavior; in the size of units, and their efficiency.
Significant will be ability of each empowered individual and organizational entity, out at the edges, in interpreting and maximizing the available information. These facts emphasize the necessity of focusing on the human domain more than merely equipping military personnel with information technologies. 48 It is only the human mind, which can best make sense of any situation or any problem, even in the most complex problems. The key is in acknowledging, "The mind is gifted beyond any machine -indeed, beyond its own comprehension -and it now has high-performance, distributed information systems to assist it." 49 It is important to understand how people utilize the new technological capabilities in making the most of information for supporting C2 processes. That means "enabling individuals and organizations to create value in new ways." 50 Kott asserts, "Situation awareness, collaboration, and effective decision-making are three most salient processes of successful battle action and C2." 51 In short, humans conduct these processes with support of technology, not vice versa. Kott further provides that "the quality of battle C2 is critically dependent on the extent to which the decision makers understand the situation and on the degree of cognitive load they experience." 52 Education and training efforts must concentrate on preparing military personnel to make sense of presented information better, collaborate without constraints, self-synchronize, make decisions, and communicate decision effectively.
Lack of Focus on the
Information has always played a key role in military operations. Ability to obtain information and process it has led to decisive information advantage over an opponent.
Access to new ITs has vastly increased a force's ability to collect, process, distribute and use information. This all signifies necessity of free information distribution, and utilizing all sources in obtaining and leveraging information in support of C2.
Constraint Distribution of Information. In concert with the book Understanding
Command and Control, the term information for purposes of this paper includes "data, information, understanding, knowledge, and wisdom." 53 
Pub-53-01-1 Command and
Control in operations specifies that information management is an organized process.
The key drivers of this process are both the commander's critical information requirements and his/her guidance related to requirements for exchanging information either vertically or horizontally. 54 This doctrinal document defines the essence of information management as an "organized process utilized for constant provisioning of important information to the right person in the right time in usable format for enhancing situational awareness and decision-making." 55 Although there is principally nothing wrong with this definition, the document further emphasizes that this is pre-dominantly a commander-centric process, as it serves primarily a commander with information. 56 Upon adoption of collected information, commander's staff turns information into intelligence and pushes it, respecting guidance on information exchange requirements, either vertically or horizontally to identified users. 57 Such doctrinal guidance is clearly a legacy of the Industrial Age militaries, which "follows this practice of preplanning organized system, and constrained distribution. shifted purely to maneuver brigades and battalion, and no or minimal effort has remained toward functional elements. 63 This practice results in a major technological disproportion between maneuver and functional modules. In parallel with a lack of technology comes a lack of education and training. The 2010 Annual SFNEC Report is the first document to identify such shortfalls and stipulate requirements for coordination and mutual coherence of all NEC implementation projects. 64 It suggests initiating, in 2012, NEC implementation projects for all functional support areas. 65 On the other hand, the report does not recognize necessity for more proportionate and incremental MCP approach to NEC implementation.
Despite the SFNEC's provisions, both maneuver brigades and their battalions receive the new technology simultaneously. 66 The MCPs should ensure that two battalion size task force formations with all the functional support modules receive technological and educational means and attention. Subsequently a second package of two battalions should follow until all maneuver battalion size formations are completed.
The air force should adopt a similar approach to its wing-size formations. This approach is consistent with national political-military ambition and ensures incremental adoption of constantly improving information technology. 67 Both fiscal constraints and the dynamic pace of new technology advancement indicate a necessity to distribute all associated costs and modernization projects in a more proportionate manner throughout several years. Although, the SFNEC emphasize such argument of a balanced adoption of new technologies and the adherence to political-military ambitions these provisions have not materialized in practice. 68 All maneuver battalion formations received simultaneously only some parts of new technology, but not the entire package. This means that all of them can fulfill only minimal operational requirements. 69 The current structure of function-oriented units and the inconsistent implementation of the SFNEC create an even more significant problem in deployable brigades and battalion task forces. First, the battle-staff structures of these formations lack functional combat support elements, which must ensure 24/7 performance of control function. Second, these structures are composition of functional, enclosed stovepipes throughout all command levels.
Insufficient Battle-Staff Structures. The principal doctrinal document related to description of command and control concepts PUB 53-01-2 Staff Processes in
Operations provides detailed guidance on brigade, battalion and company level command post (CP) arrangements. CP composition signifies the necessity of a specialty based organization. 70 It reflects the broadening of the future military mission spectrum and it describes the necessity to establish either permanent or ad hoc specialty-and threat-based functional groups. 71 Such a philosophy follows traditional, Industrial Age warfare C2 principles such as "decomposition, specialization, hierarchy, optimization, deconfliction, centralized planning, and decentralized execution." 72 These principles are not exclusive to the ACR. They remain important elements in most of today's military organizations. 73 However, in the face of future operational environment complexity, the broadening spectrum of missions, and the emerging needs for rapid and unconstrained information sharing these principles and practices "will not permit an organization to bring all of its information (and expertise) or its assets to bear." 74 Traditional way of thinking is not suited to realizing the Information Age key force capabilities of interoperability and agility. 75 An Industrial Age way of thinking, in principle, relies on centralized planning and the ability to specify information exchange requirements and collaboration in advance. However, in increasingly complex situations, it is impossible to know with whom and when one needs to share information in advance. 76 The organizational transformation needs to focus on changing these weapons, and infrastructure, systems, and personnel. 80 The SFNEC determines three
MCPs to achieve the transformation of the ACR into a 21 st century information age networked enabled force. An incremental approach will better address all deployable formations, and achievements of final operational capability requirements in accordance with politicalmilitary ambitions.
The disadvantages associated with widening the scope of the MCPs in the SFNEC relate to an increase of fiscal resources in the initiation phase, as there will be a need for more training and education courses related to new C2 concepts, approaches and way of thinking. It will require a radical change in the composition of the courses and entities participating in their organization. Extensive cooperation with civilian contractors prior the development of trained instructors and lecturers will also be essential, as with reviewing mid-term research and innovations plans and enhancing the research focus. However, the adoption of battalion wise incremental modernization approach, instead of current mass approach could mitigate the risk of fiscal increase.
Transforming the Organizational Structure of the ACR. The current modular organizational structure of the ACR is the main source of inconsistent implementation of a national NEC strategy. It is necessary to provide functional CS and CSS modules the same capability as maneuver modules. Presently, they do not receive the same developmental priority from the strategic level. 82 This must change. In addition to confusing the implementing of the SFNEC, this structure increases the routine sustainment cost of the ACR because functional brigade headquarters (HQs) are nondeployable. 83 These HQs serve merely as the peacetime administrative C2 elements of their subordinate deployable modules. 84 The MoD must rethink the functional brigade based model. It should dismantle the functional brigades and redistribute the functional CS and CSS battalions equally into both maneuver brigades, as obtained before December 2003. These steps will facilitate political-military ambitions, preserve the capacity to generate deployable formations, and maintain the concept of modular, task driven deployable formations. Additionally, it will offer the potential of considerable fiscal savings for other projects. Most importantly, it will focus development priorities in both the maneuver and functional modules, and enhance interoperability, combat power, and the effectiveness of the deployable formations.
These proposed organizational structure changes will require yet another painful force restructuring. The Chief of Defense has many times declared his concerns in relation to the structural stability of the force and therefore the benefits of such force reconstruction will need thorough deliberation. Further, dismantling of functional brigades' commands from the force structure will result in a decrease of experienced, senior and mid-ranking personnel from the brigades' leadership and staff. However, there is a reasonable space to enlarge maneuver brigades' staff; the JFC's and MoD's functional staff cells, which are at present significantly undermanned in numbers and
capabilities. This will strengthen effectiveness of maneuver brigades' staffs and overall C2 processes. Additionally, there is an arithmetical prediction of fiscal saving in regards to lowering the numbers of personnel, equipment and the usage of infrastructure. approaches and concepts. Leaders will need to push down decision-making authority to lower levels; and foster mutual trust across all levels of command. Primarily longserving personnel in the MoD, responsible for education, training, and doctrinal development, will be first to initiate this shift. There will be requirement for language improvements as majority of C2 research bibliography is available only in English.
Revision of Doctrinal Documents -Embedding
Additionally, the MoD leadership will need to create an atmosphere of urgency in the ACR for NEC Information Age culture. Initial and subsequent constant seminar like education will have to be established, which will stretch already tight working hours at the strategic and operational levels. The proposed recommendations will enable the force to become valuable member of multinational formations throughout the entire likely spectrum of operations in the security environment of the 21 st century.
Conclusions
The Czech strategic documents provide the guidance that signifies the need for making the ACR a smaller, more effective military force, fully interoperable in a multinational environment. The MoD, in its transformation plans relies on the use of high-technology command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence systems (C4I) to leverage its military assets. 86 Advanced Information technology has the potential to enhance combat power and the effectiveness of the force. Information technology advances without changes in organization structure, C2 approaches and concepts, organizational culture and doctrine, however great, would merely mean higher expenses and a marginal enhancement of capabilities. The MoD must strive to fix weaknesses primarily in the human developmental and doctrinal areas. A strategy for the NEC must provide a long-term vision through well-thought and balanced MCPs.
Although, there are risks associated with a shift in strategy for NEC and organizational structure, they are marginal in comparison with the prospect of enhanced future force effectiveness. The MoD needs to create an atmosphere of urgency for NEC implementation and necessity to accommodate network enabled Information Age culture. There must persistently push for change in human and organizational behavior to exploit fully the opportunity for information superiority. Only through long-term sustained actions in all these areas will the ACR achieve its transformation force goals for the 21 st Century.
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